

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Barry Gray STATION WMCA

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FULL TEXT

BARRY GRAY: I have the pleasure of talking to Mr. Gerald Lefcourt, an attorney. He's represented the Black Panthers in the east. Mr. Noel Benn, the author of "The Kremlin Letter" and "The Shadow Boxer", now in paperback. Mr. Victor Marchete, author of "The Rope Dancer", published by Grosset and Dunlap. He was a high-ranking CIA officer for fourteen years. And Mr. Jerry Goodman, recently appointed executive director of the American Jewish Congress on Soviet Jewry.

Mr. Marchete, how did you get into the CIA?

VICTOR MARCHETE: I was recruited when I was in college by a CIA man, a professional recruiter. I had been spotted by a cleared faculty consultant at the university. As you probably suspect, the agency has quite a few contacts at universities for a number of reasons, one of which is to identify young students on their way to graduation who have some talents that they may be interested in.

GRAY: What were you majoring in?

MARCHETE: Russian studies at the time.

GRAY: Do you speak the language?

MARCHETE: Not very well because my activities were largely in headquarters, and I had no use for the language.

GRAY: Why were you studying Russian studies?

MARCHETE: Well, I had been in Military Intelligence when I was in the army, and I was sent to Oberammergau to learn Russian at the time. After I got out of the army I decided I would like to make a career out of Intelligence, so I came back to the United

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States and went to college.

GRAY: How did you get into army Intelligence?

MARCHETE: I guess I just happened to...

MAN: Stood in the wrong line, probably.

MARCHETE: I had a high score in the ABCT (?) test, and football season was over, and I didn't want to go back to the line, so I volunteered and I was accepted, and I went off to Intelligence school.

GRAY: Which was Heidelberg?

MARCHETE: No, it was Oberammergau in Germany.

GRAY: I see. So you did not come to the States then for Intelligence school.

MARCHETE: Well, this was Military Intelligence at the time and no, they had one in Europe, you see. They had a very good installation at Oberammergau where they taught languages and trained officers for Intelligence work. I don't know if the installation still exists but it did at the time because we had the Seventh Army there and several divisions.

MAN: That was really before the CIA was in full swing, was it not?

MARCHETE: No, the CIA was already operating. This was in the early fifties, but there was quite a bit of activity on the borders, a great deal of illegal border crossing, many of which were the refugees trying to come east, but among the refugees would be of course the Soviet agents and East German agents and so they set up border teams all along the East German and the Czechoslovak border.

GRAY: You remind me -- I had a lawyer friend who was also in Army Intelligence, and he was sent to language school and given a crash course in Japanese and learned to speak it and understand it very well. He was fluent. He came out of the army speaking Japanese as though he were born in Japan. He's been doing negligence work for 25 years. (LAUGHTER)

MAN: Among Japanese-Americans?

GRAY: No, he's in New York.

MARCHETE: Now that you're on the subject of training, though, the CIA's training was much, much better than that which the military provided, of course, and much more interesting. Well,

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they have an installation down near Williamsburg known as isolation. It's one of the training camps. It's under, I think, naval cover, but it's where we would go for our training. You got basic training there, and also certain advanced courses were given.

GRAY: How did they approach you?

MARCHETE: Well, I got this phone call when I was in school, one day from a fellow, and he said, "I'm a friend of your brothers, and you don't know me, but I'd like to see you. I'm in town. Would you come up to this room at such-and-such a hotel, and don't tell the desk clerk. Just come up and knock on the door." I took him at his word. He sounded legitimate, and he was to an extent, and knocked on the door, and there were two fellows in the room, and I realized exactly what was happening. And I'd had just enough experience in Intelligence in the army to know I was now being recruited.

GRAY: I see. And how did they approach you?

MARCHETE: Well, they start talking to you and they ask you what you're doing and what you would like to do. And they begin to interrogate you on your political attitudes. If a recruiter were working today, say at Buffalo University, if they had someone there that they thought they might want, he would ask him what he thought of Attica. And if he sounded like Jerry over here, the recruiter after a while would say, "Well, it was nice meeting you, fella. See you around." (LAUGHTER)

MAN: And shoot him in the back as he walked out.

MARCHETE: If you sounded like Governor Rockefeller, you'd probably be told, "Look, we'll get in touch with you in a couple of weeks."

GRAY: And you get a GS rating in CIA?

MARCHETE: Yes, they have the GS system. They actually are not part of the civil service, but they follow the civil service just for convenience sake. You can be hired or fired at any time in the CIA. You do not have civil service tenure unless they're willing to grant it to you.

GRAY: And how high did you rise?

MARCHETE: I was at GS-15 when I left. That's the equivalent of a full colonel. But my last three assignments were GS-16 assignments.

GRAY: Which was brigadier.

MARCHETE: Yes. For example, that is the rank that goes with the executive assistant to the deputy director, which was my last assignment.

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GRAY: And may I ask what kinds of assignments they were?

MARCHETE: The last three were all staff assignments in the executive suite, one as assistant to the number-two man, one as assistant to the number-three man, and prior to that and in some ways the most dangerous thing was the assistant to the chief of planning, programming, and budgeting where they keep all the books. And this was very, very secret.

GRAY: That's the stuff that the Congress would love to see.

MARCHETE: Yes, certain members of Congress would really like to see it, but they will not have any opportunity under the existing system.

GRAY: Are you permitted to tell me what you guess the CIA spends in a year?

MARCHETE: Yes. I think I'm permitted to tell you. I'm going to tell you. They're spending close to 700 million dollars a year. That is, in annual appropriated funds. There is additional spending that gets very complicated, and while I understand it, I'm not an accountant, and I have difficulty explaining it, but there are such things as investments, and there's more money made available. A good example of this is the Laotian -- the private war in Laos that the CIA is fighting. When I would have to justify an increase in the budget for that with someone from the Bureau of the Budget, we did talk to these people and explain things to them. Now, I can remember telling them that it was costing us 25 million dollars a year, according to the figures I had, and there were 40,000 males in the army and a few others, tribesmen. And I knew that that 25-million-dollar figure was wrong. It couldn't be right. All that really covered was the meals...

GRAY: Loincloths.

MARCHETE: Yeah. But they come cheap. I think they fight for eight cents a day, or something like that. Yet I knew there was, you know, Air America's costs, and even though it's a wholly-owned subsidiary of the CIA, they do charge for their services. There were the bombing raids of course and the ordnance that was being expended in those raids, and of course the agency had built some tremendous bases up-country in Laos, so that this money had to come from somewhere and I could never quite figure it out myself except that it was buried somewhere in the military budget. I found out the other day when Senator Fulbright released that information that it was actually costing 450 million dollars a year to fight that war in Laos.

GRAY: Well, that's a 425-million-dollar difference.

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MARCHETE: Yes.

GRAY: Where do you get the 425 million?

MARCHETE: The Pentagon was putting it up for us.

GRAY: So you got 25 million -- it's like a nightclub act being paid on the top and on the bottom.

MARCHETE: In a sense.

GRAY: ...in a brown paper bag.

MARCHETE: Every time there's a special project, the money just appears for it.

MAN: And it will not affect your basic operation.

MARCHETE: Oh, yes. The agency has what they call a contingency fund, which is limitless, literally. And it gets very large at times and then they get embarrassed and they have to....

GRAY: And who do you have to answer to?

MARCHETE: Normally if it's a fairly easily-explained arrangement the process is to talk to the director of what was then the Bureau of the Budget. It's now the Office of Management and Budget.

GRAY: That's just one man or a committee?

MARCHETE: One man, and he had some staff people especially assigned to Intelligence, one of which was assigned to the CIA, so that you have one fellow trying to follow what the CIA is doing and he doesn't stand much of a chance. But anyhow, we would tell him what we needed the money for, give him some sort of a justification in a briefing, and then the operation itself would usually be approved by a special committee called the 303 -- it was then called the 303 committee. The name was since changed; it's probably -- I have no idea what the name is today but each administration has its own code name for the special little group which consists of the President's national security adviser, the deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence. So the four then would decide that, yes, CIA needed more money to do this particular operation. Now, the only reason this group met was to pass on operations which were either extremely sensitive and with high flap potential. That is, they could blow up in our face, like penetrating the National Student Association or something of that sort. Well, they would meet and say, "Yeah, sure, let's do it," because they all think alike, of course, these fellows. Then usually all that would be done after that

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other than having the national security adviser perhaps check with the President would be for the director or some -- usually the director, perhaps someone else, his deputy to whisper in the ear of the chairman of the subcommittee that oversees the CIA, of which there are three -- one in the Senate and two in the House. And if the Senator nodded, that was good enough. And I know in one instance, when Senator Russell headed the committee, he said, "Don't tell me about it. I don't want to know about it, but okay."

MAN: A wise man.

GRAY: Were you involved personally in clandestine operations?

MARCHETE: If you mean did I actually walk the back alleys, do that, no, not really.

GRAY: Who does that?

MARCHETE: The largest part of the agency does that. The agency is broken down into four main sections, one of which is devoted to clandestine operations, and this is the single largest and most expensive part of the agency.

GRAY: How large?

MARCHETE: It accounts for about -- roughly 50 percent of the agency's total size.

GRAY: How large is the agency?

MARCHETE: There are about 18,000 people in there.

GRAY: Did you carry credentials?

MARCHETE: Yes, I carried a card that said I was a CIA member. I could use this if I were going, say, to some...

MAN: Take it on a bus (?).

MARCHETE: No, it wouldn't get you anything at the A & P either, but if I had to meet, say, with someone at a factory somewhere...

GRAY: Like an army ID card.

MARCHETE: That's all it was.

GRAY: How did your work coincide with or oppose that of the FBI?

MARCHETE: Well, the FBI operates largely in this country and the CIA largely abroad, but there is some overlap.

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MAN: Except that you told me before, which was I think rather fascinating, which I don't think many people have any understanding of because in this country you never hear of CIA agents making any arrests, but you assume that the CIA and the United States government aren't going to spend all that money, say, keeping up with Russia whom they can sit down and negotiate with, whom they have a military balance of power with. What are they doing about, you know, the Black Panther Party whom they can't sit down and negotiate with, and they certainly have no military balance of power with, don't understand to begin with, and the thing you said to me off the air was interesting, about the local heads of secret police, say for instance the New York secret police, which I think is much older than the Central Intelligence Agency...

GRAY: The Bureau of Special Services?

MAN: Bureau of Special Services. It was called -- it's now been -- I think it's had its fifteenth name change since 1912. It started out as the Radical Bureau. But say, the head of that going for some training at the Central Intelligence Agency, then you could understand what kind of operations they have, you know.

MARCHETE: Well, this is all, of course, as you could imagine, very, very sensitive and closely-held. And all I was aware of was that various police departments like the Chicago police were being entertained and assisted in training by some of our security people and some other types. Now I don't know exactly what was going on. I have some suspicions.

MAN: Wouldn't you say, also, there is a big problem here which is that the police have a very specific goal in mind. What they're after is a legal conviction. And an Intelligence agency -- I mean, to incorporate the techniques of Intelligence agencies -- an Intelligence agency is after, in essence, foreign knowledge. What they do with it...

MARCHETE: Well, I'm not so sure that's altogether...

(CROSSTALK)

MAN: One of my big beefs is that classical description of Intelligence which you just gave has faded somewhat in recent years in the CIA. We were just talking about Laos. They are involved in paramilitary activities. But they have a large program for covert action, and this is the...

MAN: Co'-vert action.

(CROSSTALK)

GRAY: Cuh'-vert or co'-vert?

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MAN: Cuh'-vert.

GRAY: Cuh'-vert.

MAN: You don't pull the coe'-vers over you at night, do you? You pull the covers over you. Covert action. (LAUGHTER)

GRAY: How do you spell covert?

MAN: C-o-v-e-r-t.

(CROSSTALK, LAUGHTER)

MAN: Anyway, their covert action program was designed to counter KGB activities and other Communist activities in Western Europe and other areas in the cold war period. And they developed some very good techniques. And the idea is to penetrate a student group or cultural organization or labor organization and then begin to manipulate it. And this costs a lot of money.

GRAY: Mr. Marchete. I keep coming back to some vital statistics. Why did you leave and when?

MARCHETE: I left two years ago, and the reason I left was that I had grown disenchanted with the agency and I had lost faith in its leadership. I shouldn't say just the agency, but with the entire United States Intelligence system.

GRAY: But what does an unemployed Intelligence man do?

MARCHETE: You write books. No, the..

MAN: Talk about being blacklisted.

MARCHETE: The first thing you do is you decide how are you going to get it out of your system and get back into the normal stream of things. In my case, I originally wanted to write a critical analysis, a call for reform in the system...

GRAY: Which is pretty hard to do with broken knuckles.

NOEL BENN: It's pretty hard to do because no one knows what you're writing. When you've got it out there, you look at this document and no one knows the first thing about it.

MARCHETE: Yes, you're absolutely right, Noel. I subsequently did do something, and the comment I got from someone up here in New York is, "It's too academic."

MAN: "We're not interested."

MAN: Are you in danger?

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MARCHETE: No, I don't think so. I might need your services after tonight, with the way things are going.

MAN: Well, I should think you should need the services of somebody, you know, who carries guns.

GRAY: A little muscle.

MAN: Things like that.

MAN: Can you be prosecuted rather than persecuted or maybe...

GRAY: How do you get out? I mean, it must be like being a member of any organized group over or underworld. How do you get out?

MARCHETE: You resign. They give you three years to declassify, and then you're free. Actually, it's a very subtle thing. I left, and when I left the director said to me, "Well, you've evidently thought this thing over, and nothing I can say is going to change your mind." And I said, "Yes, that's right." He said, "Well, what are your plans?" I said, "I don't know. Maybe I'll write a novel or something." And he said -- I think I may have said, "Maybe I'll write a book." And he said, "Well, you know, if you need any help we'll type it for you." (LAUGHTER) And I said, "No, thank you." And then he said to me, "Well, look, when you get hungry, come on back. There'll be a job for you." And I said, "Well, I appreciate that very much," and I walked out of the building and drove home and cried all the way home. I was leaving something that was really a big part of my life.

BENN: When they read this book and they read about a defector...

GRAY: When you were employed within the CIA and people said, "What do you do for a living?" what was your response?

MARCHETE: Well, up until the last few years when I was high enough up and visible because of working in the executive suite I used to say all kinds of silly things. First of all, you tried to avoid having anyone ask you that question.

GRAY: It's a very normal question. "My name is Jones. What's yours?" You say, "Marchete." "Well, I'm in real estate. What do you do?"

MARCHETE: Then I would say, "I'm in government," and everybody would laugh because that was a dead giveaway that you were probably with CIA. The normal person would answer, "I'm working for the Federal Communications." But we would say we're in government. Then we would say, well, we're in foreign relations. Then, "Well, actually, I'm in State Department," and that was

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kind of foolish, but the clandestine operators who were-- who had covers built for them would give whatever their cover was -- "I'm working for..."

MAN: Cover, not covert.

MARCHETE: No, they were in the Bureau of Printing or they were working for some private firm or whatever, and this was backstopped, of course. It would be very difficult to determine if they were in line.

GRAY: What's the death toll for the clandestine CIA operative?

MARCHETE: I have no idea how many they've lost. I do know that they have a wonderful knack for getting themselves into some Godawful situations.

GRAY: Well, they keep hiring guys who can't pronounce "Attica."
(LAUGHTER) They're not street-smart.

MAN: I would imagine their death rates are very low, infinitesimal.

MARCHETE: Probably.

GRAY: ...eighteen thousand.

MAN: No. Except in a combat zone, they don't go around shooting one another. I mean, what's going to happen if the Russians catch an agent? They'll trade him for someone we've caught.

GRAY: Well, maybe I should have used, instead of "death toll," what's their loss toll?

MARCHETE: If you're referring to the...

MAN: He's referring to the -- I thought you might have been referring to agents as well as career people.

GRAY: I'm talking about the agents who are involved in the clandestine operations...

(CROSSTALK)

They're held and they're traded off. "We've got three of yours, and we want Colonel Abel."

MARCHETE: If you had three of our guys, you probably wouldn't have three career officers. What you would have are three agents who were working for career officers.

MAN: Are they called controls, the career officers? Are they control agents?

MAN:

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MAN: ...running a network.

GRAY: The other guys are on a need-to-know basis, I would assume, are they not? I use the word "operative" because -- you know, the agent, he's usually operating on a need-to-know basis. He only gets to know as much as he has to know, so grabbing him is really just one toe of the whole foot.

MARCHETE: That's right. The way it usually works is the CIA man is under cover, say, as a foreign service officer attached to the embassy, much the way the Soviets do it. And he's pretty safe. If he should happen to get caught with his hand in the cookie jar, it's, you know, 48 hours and get out of the country, persona non grata. But he has recruited people who are doing the actual spying or are the go-betweens with the spies. Now these guys, when they get caught, they're usually nationals of the country they're...

GRAY: They're in very big trouble, yeah.

MAN: ...all the suicides in Germany when you broke the...

(CROSSTALK)

GRAY: And we have the same thing here, obviously, when we grab an American who's involved.

MAN: Barry, can I ask a question? Something that Mr. Marchete raised? To what extent do Soviet and American agents in the field where they are in areas of neutral -- you know, geographic -- let's say West Berlin, where east and west shuffle back and forth -- to what extent do these agents share data? Because they know who each one is. I mean, that we know. And they are after the same objective. To what extent do they kind of pass things back and forth because they assist one another?

GRAY: You're going to have to hold the answer, Mr. Marchete, I'm sorry, because we come up to the midnight news shortly. We're talking about the Central Intelligence Agency with Mr. Victor Marchete, who was a high-ranking CIA officer for fourteen years and let's not forget that he's written a marvelous book. It's in novel form, but I guarantee it will not be put down until you finish the last page. It's called "The Rope Dancer", published by Grosset and Dunlap. Mr. Jerry Goodman, recently appointed executive director of the American Jewish Congress of Soviet Jewry. He's researched the espionage networks of the Communist world and the Mid-East. And Mr. Noel Benn, who's made a life's work of working within the CIC of the United States army and has written two successful books, "The Kremlin Letter", which was a movie, and "The Shadow Boxer", now in paperback. And Mr. Gerald Lefcourt, who's an attorney representing the Black Panthers, Abbie Hoffman, Mark Rudd, and other well-known personalities.

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I guess you could put it that way.

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GRAY: Ladies and gentlemen, our program continues. My guest, Mr. Jerry Goodman. He is executive director of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry. He has researched the espionage network of the Communist world and the Middle East. Mr. Victor Marchete, author of a fine novel about the world of Intelligence and espionage called "The Rope Dancer", published by Grosset and Dunlap. He was a high-ranking CIA officer for fourteen years. Mr. Noel Benn, author of "The Kremlin Letter", which has been made into a movie, and "The Shadow Boxer", now in paperback. Mr. Gerald Lefcourt, an attorney who has represented the Black Panthers, Abbie Hoffman, Mark Rudd, and many of those who find themselves most unpopular in the American press. You still do that.

GERALD LEFCOURT: Yes, I still do that. Matter of fact, I'm going to trial next week on an old Black Panther case that nobody cares about any more but it's going to trial in the Bronx. Burton Roberts is waving a flag at me.

GRAY: But Burton Roberts is a friend outside the courtroom.

LEFCOURT: Yeah, but he can be a terror in the courtroom.

GRAY: Rough prosecutor.

LEFCOURT: It's the kind of case where some prosecutors would dismiss it because of the nature of the case and the nature of his evidence, but not Burton.

GRAY: I had an interesting Freudian slip take place on the air here Monday night. That Attica show that I told you about with vanden Heuvel and others. And in the last half hour of the show, I gave all of the guests earphones, and we opened the phone to the audience, and I wanted to see whether the 60 or 70 or 80 minutes that we'd done on Attica had made any impression and what the reaction of the listener was. And they could call and talk to any one of the guests. And again, we had an ex-con just out of Attica. We had a fellow from the Fortune Society. I think he's done time two or three times. vanden Heuvel -- I'm trying to remember the fourth guest. It will come. Oh, I'm sorry -- David Rothenberg, who represents the Fortune Society in kind of a PR capacity and certainly an involved capacity even though he himself is not an ex-con. It's very funny because I thought he was, and he said, "No, I've never been in jail." But when you say, "Fortune Society," the immediate assumption is you've done time.

At any rate, I got one guy who called up very agitated. He hated everybody on the panel, hated me, and he said, "Jerry

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Kunstler ought to get a bullet right between the eyes." Which I thought was a very interesting Freudian marriage. End of that.

MARCHETE: You know those guys. They all look alike.

GRAY: Yeah, Jerry Kunstler. And you dance too, I hear. Back to the CIA. Am I allowed to talk about your present activities, political activities?

MARCHETE: Yes.

GRAY: What are you involved in now?

MARCHETE: Well, I am now trying to create some interest in Congress for a review of the CIA and the Intelligence community in the hope that some reform and some change will come out of this.

GRAY: For example.

MARCHETE: I'm in contact with Congressman Badillo, and I hope, when I get back, to be put in touch with a couple of Senators whom I don't want to name right now because I don't know if they're willing to cooperate or not. The idea is to begin to bring forth in Congress and to the press and to the American people certain things that are going on in the Intelligence community which may be legal, but which are of doubtful morality such as the paramilitary activities in Laos and elsewhere, and also the covert action program.

GRAY: I find myself, though, really ambivalent there. You know, it is a dirty business. Was it Oliver Wendell Holmes that said that? That espionage is a dirty business? It is a dirty business, but we're living in a very dirty world. Everybody has got their espionage activity going. Now we simply can't act like Oxford-Cambridge gentlemen.

MARCHETE: No, I'm not advocating that. I'm just saying that -- you see, you keep referring to espionage. There's nothing wrong with espionage. Espionage is needed in modern society just as long as nations do not get along with each other, and some of them...

GRAY: Even if they do.

MAN: Maybe we ought to define espionage.

MARCHETE: Yeah, this is the point, these other things. Paramilitary activity is not espionage.

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: Paramilitary is exactly what it says. There are non-military personnel involved in military activities.

MARCHETE: They are not collecting --- Espionage is defined they are not collecting information.

GRAY: No, they're shooting people.

BENN: That's right.

GRAY: And if you're going to shoot people, use the Marines.

MARCHETE: Exactly.

GRAY: Yeah.

MARCHETE: This is my theory.

(OVERTALK)

MARCHETE: If the United States feels so strongly about what's going on in some jungle country somewhere, so strongly that they feel they have to use force to influence events down there, I think they should do it in an open fashion. Either through the U.N. or at least be honest enough to just send the Marines down there, if no one else agrees with you.

GRAY: But do you know the United States is doing it?

GOODMAN: Yeah, but ...

GRAY: I'm sorry. Jerry, go on.

GOODMAN: It seems to me that's the essence of the problem. I mean, either what you're trying to say is what many have tried to say over the years, is, why can't we have a democratic society? That, if we're going to go to war with somebody, why can't, you know go about it in ways that make sense. You know, why do we have to have a Central Intelligence Agency who's not responsible to the people --- they are not elected officials --determine foreign policies by secretly, or covertly invading a country and starting a war? And, you know, in other words, why can't we be a democratic society?

GRAY: Well, in a way, President Nixon answered you today. Didn't he make a statement referring to the government in Saigon and he said, well, of all the governments we do business with, only a small proportion are democracies.

MARCHETE: Jerry, it may be a little more tragic. It's not that they make foreign policy, because they are an arm or an extension of foreign policy, with the full knowledge of everyone else who is responsible under the Constitution for making foreign policy, whether it be the Secretary of State, or, of course,

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basically, the President. In other words, the denial by the Administration - any Administration --

(OVERTALK)

MARCHETE: They made the fact, and the fact that a particular President may say, well, you know, he's not aware of the nitty gritty details on the lower level. That's something else. But in terms of the basic policy. And you cannot tell me that the President doesn't know about the action in Laos.

(OVERTALK)

GRAY: ... Under the heading of whose ox is being gored, the Israelis, I am led to believe, have about the best espionage network going today.

MARCHETE: For a small nation.

GRAY: For a small nation.

MARCHETE: Well, it's probably one of the best in the world, period.

GRAY: That gives them life and hope, obviously. I'm also of the very strong opinion that if the difficulties in Ireland are to be resolved, they will be resolved through a great deal of espionage which might prevent or keep down the amount of violence that's being done.

MARCHETE: So, we're kind of talking at two different levels.

GRAY: It's better to tap a phone than start shooting.

GOODMAN: It seems that there are a lot of different levels. One is, there are some who say that a President Nixon would know about all covert actions. There are others who seem to say and I think probably so, that by recruiting a certain kind of individual, the kind of individual who would think that the inmates should be, certainly machine gunned down at Attica, rather than someone who has some compassion for them. Then you have the kind of personnel in the CIA that make political decisions for a country, or advise the President the best way ...

GRAY: ...But Jerry -- But Jerry, you have to lift off two layers. You start with the layer of the President, or you start with a layer of the Governor, who condoned it, obviously by his actions, and then you go to the second layer, where the President of the country, an elected official -- not a member of the CIA -- picks up the phone and congratulates the Governor. So all those who happen to be in government service, whether it be CIA or any other vis-a-vis even the Calley case, say, "Hey, that's the way the boss likes it, and I guess that's the way I'll play it." The Calley case ... even a better example...

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(OVERTALK)

MSRCHETE: You're putting your finger right on the problem, and that's the Executive branch. The Executive - the Chief Executive and his leading administration officials, tend to all think the same way. They're relatively conservative, whether they're Democrats or Republicans. They're relatively conservative. They believe in things like the American Imperium, law and order, and all the other cliches. There are certain Congressmen, obviously, the more senior Senators and Representatives who believe this and cooperate with them. The only way you're going to get more of a national feeling in here is if you can spread the responsibility further into Congress so that some of the younger Representatives; some of the younger Senators; as some who have more liberal ideas are included in on the decision-making process.

GOODMAN: But my point is that isn't the fact that they will cooperate with them a Central Intelligence agency matter? Doesn't the Central Intelligence Agency care to a great extent who is President of the United States, or the head of any particular labor union in the United States.

(OVERTALK)

JERRY: Don't they make sure that unions continue to ask for money, as they did in Europe, you know, instead of asking for any kind of social change.

GRAY: Another level. Right now we're seeing a big shake-up -- quotes -- of the New York City Police Department. Most of the cops that you talk to, or, you know, the few that you get to talk to have the attitude, "Well, this guy will go away. There'll be a new Commissioner." Like this President will go away and there'll be a new President. Yet, those GS guys, they go on forever. It's the Lindsay syndrome. Three hundred and fifty thousand people on the City payroll; maybe forty thousand or eighty thousand are doing an honest day's for an honest day's dollar. A lot of them goofing off because Lindsay's going to go away, and there'll be a new guy, and the new guy will, and so on.

MARCHETE: But what I'm suggesting is something very, very terrible. That they make sure they get the kind of guy in there, that they can do business with.

(OVERTALK)

GRAY: I believe the cliché we get the government we deserve and I think that Mr. Nixon is reflecting the attitude of the people of the United States at this given moment in our history. And I will also add, even though it hurts to say it, I think he's going to be a very tough candidate to beat in 1972, in light of some of the events in the country, and the things that I hear coming off those phones.

MARCHETE: But that's partially -- I mean, I'm sure I think we'll hear about it before the program's over, a great, you know, a great propaganda effect by such forces as Intelligence forces. I mean, the way to win an election, if there was a candidate opposing Thieu who was to the Left of Thieu would be to spread money and to spread propaganda and carry on, and create those incidents which discredit the other fellow. And in this way you can control society. Now, this is the kind of business I think that they're into. Spending money to pay off people to get the candidate they want, to discredit people, propagandize the population. I think that's what we've been subject to. I mean, I think that we got Nixon because intelligence in this country has been very effective.

GRAY: They should be so efficient.

GOODMAN: Yeah, I don't agree.

(OVERTALK)

BENN: ...A few minutes ago, because this was his first book and I ran into it when I did "The Kremlin Letter" I had to go out and do the promotion. And they had -- these guys had never read his book. But I had to study intelligence. I had to put in some time, way back, twenty years ago. But I literally had to bone up on it. And I suddenly found that I could say anything about it, because no one knew anything about it. And that means I could be talking to intelligence officials, and they would know exactly what they had done, and this is in public, or in private. And they would know, certainly, what their operation did. But they would always sit there, and you could say, well so and so and so and so, and they would accept it. And I was asking Victor had he run into that? Have you run into it.

MARCHETE: Yes. And it's a little scary. People will ask questions on areas that I'm not very familiar with in intelligence, and - or they will have ideas such as you have, that they're manipulating things in this country already. And I'm afraid to answer, because they want me to agree with them. They want me to tell them that this is the case. But to answer your -- Well the best answer in your question, Noel, yes, people -- You have to be very careful of what you say, because they'd believe anything you say. And I - This is why I stumble a lot when I'm talking. I'm trying to think of ...

GRAY: ...I - well, first of all, if you've written a book you're an authority. It's the printed word. Automatically, you're an authority. For some strange reason it does not seem to have the same weight within the spoken word. Walter Cronkite is not as great an authority as a fellow who has a byline in the New York Times. In fact, if it's Cronkite -- You know, maybe he has more information on a given subject in his little finger, than a guy that's written 42 - I've met some of the editorialists of the Times and, you know, I don't want to have lunch with them. You've got the Daily News on the floor, Jerry. You know what bullet-biting went on for two days at the Daily News with this Attica. Do

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you have any idea?

MARCHETE: I can imagine.

GRAY: I mean, really, that's gut crunching. To have to write the autopsy report, because it's hard news, and there's no way to avoid it. The point is that the printed word has enormous authority in our society, and they assume, if you've written a book, you must know all there is to know about the subject.

MARCHETE: Yes, and it's -- with intelligence, because no one knows. I mean, if they ever released public files on intelligence, half of us would be out of business. It's quite marvelous.

(OVERTALK)

GRAY: One of the most knowledgeable people I know is Vladislav Farago. He's got another book coming out which will be fascinating, about the role of John L. Lewis in the pre-World War II days vis-a-vis Roosevelt and the German attempt to swing public opinion in this country. John L. Lewis was on the payroll of an alien country up until December the seventh. Did you know that Mr. (inaudible)

BENN: No, I never knew that.

GRAY: See? Well what was the other name he gave. There was another fascinating -- John L. Lewis was -- Oh, La Follette!

BENN: I'd heard the Lewis ...

GRAY: But you sit in utter shock. Now here's a fellow came out of Navy Intelligence. And he got dossiers that are just incredible. And it's also a little scary. But John L. Lewis -- you were talking about the CIA. You talk about the United Mine Workers. The United Mine Workers were obviously trying to manipulate public opinion during that period. The America First period.

MARCHETE: True. That makes a lot of sense.

GRAY: But nobody at the United Mine Workers, until they hear Vladislav Farago, who's got the hunks of paper and the correspondence until this very day would say that John L. Lewis was getting paid for it. Hard cash.

MARCHETE: It's incredible. One of the strangest stories, that's just been made public. A good old friend, Martin Bohrmann.

(OVERTALK)

BENN: I mean, I recall when you and I discussed him a couple of years ago. And you were all set to send helicopters to pull him out of the jungle, and what you didn't know, according to an old German intelligence expert, he'd been sitting and working in Moscow.

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GRAY: Only a few. Only a few. He went...

GOODMAN: ...Look, the evidence has never been made public with the data on it...

(OVERTALK)

GRAY: ...That Mueller defected. I mean these guys as early as '43 were all making their contacts. And in our intelligence files, most of them wanted to come to the United States.

MARCHETE: Right. Some of them did.

(OVERTALK)

BENN: The only one Hitler may have been oblivious to; the only one that we knew who went East, Mueller, was already negotiating with the Russians, openly. And Mueller was, of course, Bohrmann's man. When Bohrmann first disappeared, he disappeared East. But he re-emerged - I mean, when the ABC camera crew went down to cover Mandalay, why I think it was three years ago, down between the three countries in South America, there was every chance that Bohrmann might have been through there.

JERRY: Well, all the stories until then indicated that he was. And even till last year. But this data based on, you know, the expert's knowledge of a former intelligence ...

GRAY: ...One man ...

(OVERTALK)

GRAY: ...The CIA was responsible. I told you the John L. Lewis story. How about CBS and Haiti? You know, Victor might like to hear a story. I had the opportunity to go down and do an interview with Francois Duvalier, as a result of a film called "The Comedians," which maybe you'll recall was violently anti-Ton Ton Macoute and Papa Doc, and I came back with about 5,000 feet of color. I considered it a pretty rare thing. Wow! You know, you get an interview on film with Duvalier who was speaking English, I am told, for the first time. He had never spoken English. Haltingly, but he spoke it. And I was trying very hard to get it on the network, naturally. And I got a call from a guy at CBS who wanted to see the film. And I figured, Gee, this is great, we're going to have a ninety minute special on CBS. And they came and they looked at it and they said very interesting. I found out later, they had a lot of film that I would have loved to have seen, you know, that they had to talk about it in front of a Congressional Subcommittee, etc. So who's wielding the opinion? Is it CIA, or United Mine Workers, or CBS, or Ford Motor Company, or what?

MARCHETE: But that's the big business and that's the point

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of it all. I believe they're all interlocked and interrelated.

GRAY: Not necessarily. Why? We had a period in this country where the elder Henry Ford. I know. I know what's going on. When the elder Henry Ford was out of Dearborn, was publishing a paper, and running Gee ships (?) and all kinds of things.

(OVERTALK)

GRAY: ...I was going to say, openly anti-Semitic among other things, which the younger Henry has spent about 400 billion dollars trying to buy back. We have to pause for a sponsor break.

* * *

GRAY: Ladies and gentlemen, our program continues. Jerry Goodman, who's researched the espionage networks of the Communist world and the Middle East. He's Executive Director of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry. Mr. Victor Marchete, who was a high-ranking CIA officer for 14 years, author of "The Rope Dancer" published by Grosset and Dunlap. I hope you'll read it. Mr. Noel Ben. You've read his books, as what this is -- "Many Visits to the Bank". He wrote "The Kremlin Letter" which has been a motion picture, and "The Shadow Boxer" which is now in paperback, And he's now completing his third book. Is it not yet in galley?

BENN: I'd rather not talk about it.

GRAY: All right. Gerald Lefcourt, attorney who has represented some distinguished and undistinguished clients around the country; Black Panthers, Abbe Hoffman, Mark Rudd. I keep getting the same names. You could make a career out of those three cases.

LEFCOURT: But that's an old card.

GRAY: What are you working on this moment?

LEFCOURT: Well, this moment, I am getting ready to go to a trial. I have an interesting rabbi coming to trial in October which I think Jerry Goodman knows. Who is accused of being opposed to the war, and trying to get Temple Emanu-El to come around to his way of thinking.

GOODMAN: Well, it's a little more complex.

LEFCOURT: It's a little more complex than that. But his name is Bruce Goldman, and he was fired from Columbia, you remember, He was the chaplain at Columbia during the break-out in '68, and Frank Hogan was a trustee then. He's now prosecutor.

GRAY: How did you -- how did he come into your office? How did that take place.

LEFCOURT: He called me up.

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GRAY: Just like that.

LEFCOURT: Yeah.

GRAY: Is that how most of your clients come to you?

LEFCOURT: Pretty much. Except that you get around and you meet people at various places, and you might have run into somebody before but the phone call's usually what starts it.

GRAY: It's like the first date. Jerry, do you remember your first client?

LEFCOURT: Well, it was at the Legal Aid Society, as a criminal lawyers, who's probably an addict at this -- past weekend. I don't know.

GRAY: I mean, your first client in private practice.

LEFCOURT: Oh, no, I don't. I think it may be, if I'm not mistaken, I formed a corporation for a guy who wanted to go into manufacturing dresses.

(LAUGHTER)

GRAY: I was told the other night, that you started out as a conservative young man, and went full circle.

LEFCOURT: Well, in college, I was certainly a hell of a lot more conservative than I am now. Around the time of oh, '58, '59, and since then have come pretty much full circle. But by the time I was in law school, I was already in the law students' civil rights research council and things like that, and working at that.

GRAY: But in '58, '59, politically, where did you stand. I'm trying to remember, '58, '59, who our national figures at the time.

LEFCOURT: Eisenhower.

GRAY: Yeah. He was running the (inaudible-overtalk). He probably was a good guy.

LEFCOURT: Yeah. Yeah, I didn't think he was too bad. I thought he was a little quiet. Nixon was his vice President.

GOODMAN: He was pretty terrific, too.

LEFCOURT: He was pretty terrific at the time. Of course, soon after we had the Cuban thing, and I was scared about that. You know, I felt threatened personally, that I was going to be called up, and taken out of -- I don't know if I was in law school at that point, or at the end of college. And, yeah! I had very different views. I think the Civil Rights Movement, not only changed my mind about a lot of things, but what

came out of that -- But, add to it the war.

GRAY: And how do you feel today? You must get an awful lot of poison pen mail.

LEFCOURT: Yeah, it's -- especially during a controversial time, like the Panther trial in New York ...

GRAY: ...All unsigned, violent, type ...

LEFCOURT: ...There are a few signed. Once in a while, I think -- As a matter of fact, usually when I come off this program, there is a woman who listens to this program, undoubtedly is listening now, by the name of Mary Dolger.

GRAY: Oh, yeah!

LEFCOURT: Who writes an awful lot when I come off this program.

(OVERTALK)

LEFCOURT: ...Most of it is unsigned. I had one phone call ...

GRAY: ...I file her mail. I have a circular file that's bottomless. I've been hearing from her for years.

LEFCOURT: Yeah.

GRAY: Yeah.

LEFCOURT: But I'll tell you, the verdict of the Panther Case was the only period where the mail was just the opposite. I mean, there were telegrams ...

GRAY: ... Good mail ...

LEFCOURT: ...From all over the country, and the most incredible outpouring which we pinned to the wall, from every where in the United States. Just tons of great, just fantastic, great stuff, you know. It really was a great, great feeling.

GRAY: I always wondered though, about the sickness of people who have enormous courage with a pen, or with the anonymity of the telephone. And wouldn't dare say some of the things like that, you know, if they were face to face with you.

LEFCOURT: Yeah, but you know our offices were burned down right in the middle of the trial.

GRAY: Yeah, well that's an anonymous action.

LEFCOURT: ...That was, you know. I mean not somebody without courage. It took some courage to set fire to a whole building.

GRAY: No, I don't think so.

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BENN: It takes lunacy, but not courage.

LEFCOURT: Does Jerry think it was the CIA, or...

GOODMAN: ...I don't know.

(OVERTALK)

LEFCOURT: Jerry now, after he's given me his background, now he -- he would be a candidate...

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: That's right. I mean, Barry asked the question before. I mean, can you get out? What happens if you tell some of the things that you did, and...

MARCHETE: Yes, you can get out.

BENN: Isn't that kind of a gentleman's agreement, though?

MARCHETE: Yes it is, and they rely very much on the security training that one has during one's period with the agency, and on your sense of loyalty to the organization, and the people. And this is why I didn't go into non-fiction, immediately. I couldn't bring myself to write down what I wanted to except...

GRAY: But you have, you have, in "The Rope Dancer." In fact...

BENN: Yes, I did. But I did it in a kind of a ...

GRAY: ...Third person.

BENN: Yes, third person.

GRAY: It's a marvelous novel. It's a gripping novel. I must say, that you -- somebody told me one night -- I think it was the late Bennett Cerf, how many books were published in this country every week, which is an astonishing figure. And you realize that right at this moment, there are thousands of men and women sitting in rooms around the country typing away, you know, for a year, two years, researching for two or three, and then the number of books which are published each week. The number that ever get reviewed, then the fewer number that ever get talked about. And then the one, two or eight or ten that become best sellers which, in this country means something like 30,000. It's incredible. A country with 208 million people. And I see a lot of those books come into the office. And it's kind of a cliché. Every book gets the ten page test. You know, you read it, and if it grabs you, you keep going, then you know you've got yourself a really good book. I couldn't put your book down.

BENN: Well, I hope other people feel that way.

GRAY: Well how many thus far, do you know have felt that way?

BENN: Well, it just started to come out, and I had gotten one good review from John Barkum of the "Saturday Review" syndicate. He says he hopes it isn't true?

GRAY: Is there a movie in it?

BENN: Not that I know of yet. They're negotiating now.

GRAY: The people that negotiate those movie deals will negotiate you right into the hall closet. I've seen it happen. They haven't read the book either.

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: ...You sat there smiling while you were talking about ...

GRAY: ...No! I have seen more careers done in by bad agents than any other way. It's almost like -- It's Kama Kazi like. Would you agree with that, Noel?

BENN: Well, I'll tell you. Negotiating makes espionage look like a snap.

GRAY: ...Talking to a movie director who said it, and I think it's the most -- it's the truest statement I've ever heard about the movie business, related to the book business. All day long, people at agencies, and in Hollywood made deals. But very few make pictures. They're dealing all day long. And look at the product around. And I've read -- I sat last night with Cliff Gorman who is fantastic in "Lennie" --absolutely fantastic. And I have been talking about a book here for six or seven or eight years by Eugene Burdick, "The Blue Capricorn." It's almost become my bedside reading companion, you know? When I've run out of -- when I don't want read anything contemporary, this is one of the best books I've ever read in my life, and you've heard me mention it over and over and over. And I gave him a copy, and last night, he said to me, "That's the best book I've ever read in my life." It's really stories of South Pacific Life. Now in that book there must be fifteen movies, because they're vignettes, but Hollywood is going to do motorcycle pictures ...

BENN: No, no. They're finished with motorcycles.

GRAY: Now what are they going to do?

BENN: Now that they're back, it's a very strong time for adventure, mystery.

GRAY: I love espionage.

MARCHETE: I read all the time in espionage. I read Jack

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Nicholson -- an article on Jack Nicholson in "Ramparts" last month, where he said the next movie he'd like to do is a spy thriller.

GRAY: You missed him by two weeks. He was just here. Marvelous guy, too. Marvelous.

MARCHETE: I'm sure he is. I'm sure he is.

GRAY: T"The Spy Who Came In From The Cold." Many people put it away as a movie. I've seen it three times. I think it's a marvelous motion picture.

GOODMAN: But there's absolutely nothing funny in the movie. I mean, this is an era, take away Woody Allen.

LEFCOURT: I wish you would!

GOODMAN: Absolutely nothing there attempts to be funny.

GRAY: Well how can he be funny.

GOODMAN: Yeah, well ...

GRAY: The last funny was "M*A*S*H".

BENN: Well part of it was ripe. The movie died. It's pretty grim. The movies are moving away and going into strict entertainment. And they'll probably select something that even television hasn't caught onto. It could be that the movies are a little more in touch with the public. What's been explained to me, and I'm certainly no expert in this, but is that the distributors, the houses themselves, the exhibitors, are getting more and more of a say. Like, they're simply saying "No" to the youth movies. We don't want that book either. The neighborhood family audiences -- and slowly.

GRAY: ...Meanwhile, "Carnal Knowledge" is a runaway hit.

BENN: Yeah. But that isn't a youth film.

GOODMAN: I think there's a lot of self-censorship there.

BENN: Oh, I'm sure there is. But I mean it comes down to a case of economics. It comes down to what each of the houses...

GRAY: You don't make a good picture the first time. By good, I mean good economically, Jerry, you don't make your second picture. A couple of guys who just prove that regularly and keep raising money for another bad movie. But by and large,

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if you don't make money -- It's like Broadway, if you don't make money the first time up, you don't get to do your second play. You've got to keep coming back with the loot. Because that's where it's at. It's as simple as that.

LEFCOURT: It is! It's like the law business, I mean, you have to ...

GOODMAN: ...You have to go with the winners.

(OVERTALK)

LEFCOURT: No! Yeah. I had a guy call me today, and say he was (overtalk - inaudible) Louis Nizer for six months. Now, I think Louis Nizer's a fine lawyer, but surely out there there must be a thousand young men, who could undertake this particular case, as explained to me, and do a very creditable job. And a lot of guys who walk into magnificent firms. You know, the 80 names on the door, they still wind up in the back room with a guy 28 years old who's been in practice for 30 minutes. But, when you ask him who represents you, you know, your litigation, they give you the name of the boss, who hasn't been downtown for 20 years.

GRAY: I think that's called conspicuous consumption.

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: Can I ask Victor a question?

GRAY: Of course!

BENN: No.

GOODMAN: Yeah, thank you. Just curious. How would you rate the intelligence services of the major powers? Soviet Union? The United States? Maybe even China?

MARCHETE: I would say that the best intelligence service --The best intelligence system ...

GOODMAN: Oh, all right. The whole system. Go ahead.

MARCHETE: The system, is probably the United States, with the Soviets second. And we won't discuss Israel because it's not a major power.

GOODMAN: Right. Right.

MARCHETE: And I say that despite all my criticisms of it. Because the United States has tremendous technical capabilities.

BENN: And these alone are miraculous.

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GOODMAN: They used to be miraculous, Noel. This is one of my big beefs. If they start cutting some of that six billion dollars out of the intelligence community, they can take a billion out of NSA.

ALL: National Security Agency ...

GRAY: Ahh!

BENN: ...That's communications. That's the one that runs the satellites...

GRAY: Yeah. What do you mean miraculous?

BENN: Well, you figure right now. I mean, with all the to do about the U2. Well the U2 has sort of faded and now every 20 minutes flying over us are the satellites with these banks of what they call the remote sensing. It's no secret. National Geographic did an article on it. And these cameras use infra red, ultra violet, can pick up everything from two miles above the earth, to half a mile below, they can pick up everything from two miles above the earth, to half a mile below, they can tell you in China, what is planted in every square acre; what was planted there before. What new buildings have been built.

GRAY: How do we use the pictures?

MARCHETE: That's not NSA that does it, that's CIA.

(OVERTALK)

MARCHETE: Along with the military through what they call the National Reconnaissance Organization. But the way they get these satellites back is fascinating. They re-enter on their parachutes, and along comes a little old airplane, and it's put right on target, and it's a big net, and they just catch it. And this is an interesting story, Barry. When the spies in the sky were first being designed, the CIA developed the U2 and then the then the A 11, in which the military later stole from them. But that's another story. But when the satellites started to come in, the CIA was developing a system, and the Air Force Intelligence was developing a system. And, of course, the Air Force thought they knew everything about the sky. And the CIA was saying well, we'll get them together and we'll get them a good camera in it, and we'll get it up there somehow, and we'll get it around. And then the question was how do we get it back.

Well, the Air Force went into a big, long involved explanation and it was going to take two more years of research, and I don't know how many more hundreds of millions of dollars, and the CIA says, Well, we'll just take an airplane up there with a net, and catch it when it comes back in, and everyone laughed. And that's what they did, and for two years we had them before the Air Force.

(OVERTALK)

BENN: ... Not CIA, because when I was first told about remote sensing, see, I was told by the NSA. People there claimed it was theirs.

GRAY: But let me ask, how do you get that thing back in the basketball hoop in the United States. Why doesn't it land somewhere else.

MARCHETE: Well, it's over the water. It's not in the United States.

GRAY: Oh, it's over water?

GOODMAN: Why doesn't somebody else come along and pick it up?

GRAY: Yeah.

MARCHETE: Well, the first thing is, when you're running this sort of an instrument, you have the - all the data, and you can best determine where it is about to re-enter. Someone who is intercepting signals from it, would have much more difficulty in determining with any accuracy where it's going to land.

And there is a certain amount of honor among thieves. If they started catching ours, I guess, we'd start catching theirs.

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: ...Bugging telephones ...

GRAY: ..Do they have them...?

MARCHETE: Yes, the Soviets have them.

GRAY: Exactly the same thing.

MARCHETE: Well, I don't know if they're exactly the same thing, but they put up satellites which are obviously - They're obviously the photographic satellites ...

GOODMAN: ...Both of them were working in Suez.

GRAY: ...Said that they photograph from a half mile below the ground to two miles above ground, and what does it say about a city like New York? What does it tell them about New York?

MARCHETE: Well, the art of photography; the development of these cameras - It's just absolutely amazing. They're very, very, very good. The resolution is superb. Now, of course,

ther are certain things that can interfere with this. Such as cloud covers. And you cannot photograph a military installation for example, through a cloud. But if the weather is good, what they bring back is excellent pictures. Superb pictures. And then this information is fed into the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and they have machines which allow them to blow up the photographs and to make very fine measurements. And these photo interpreters are very well trained, and very good, and they can look at holes in the ground, that would appear to you and me as nothing more than holes in the ground, and they can tell you that this is - these are the beginnings of missile silos.

GRAY: Exactly what happened in Cuba.

MARCHETE: Yes.

(OVERTALK)

MARCHETE: That isn't the way we got onto Cuba. That has always been a sore point with me, and I'm glad you brought it up.

GRAY: How did we get onto Cuba.

BENN: First of all, it looked like a lot of railroad ties to me.

MARCHETE: Well, when I tell you the story, you'll know why I'm interested in it. When the Soviets began that buildup in Cuba, everyone - Everybody, all of intelligence was watching everything. Photographing the ships, and watching what was going on in Cuba, and all the information was coming in. Everybody in the United States intelligence community was saying, the Soviets have undertaken a large agricultural development program and they're sending in agricultural experts, and a lot of agricultural machinery.

Now, I and another fellow -- At this time I was an analyst in current intelligence - had developed a little homemade art with a ruler, and a few other little tools, and we had determined over a period of about a year or so, from photographs that agents would take of ships being unloaded in Egypt, in Indonesia, and other places, we began to figure out what was in some of these boxes. In each of these big crates, we began to determine that that was a crate for a MIG-21. And this was a crate for a IL-28 Bomber. And a few other things. And then we were amazed to see that the Soviets always carried these big crates above deck. On the boats, when they came up. And then we began to determine a pattern, that certain boats always carried military equipment into different areas.

Well, when we saw certain boats heading for Cuba, and then we got some pictures, and then we started spotting these crates

with the bombers on them, and the SAM missiles, and a few other things, and we were the guys that started blowing the whistle, and yelling and screaming. And John McCone listened to us. He was then Director of the Agency, and then he used his influence on the President, and that's when they went over with the U2 and found the SAM sites, and then they found the developments going on in San Cristobal and other places, and of course our boys tracked down, and said, well those are the beginnings of ICBM --of MR and IRBM sites.

But of course, they got all the credit, because they discovered the real good thing. But the - I think it was the day before -- Yes, the day of the first U2 flight, CIA was the only agency in the community that was saying, the Soviets have an unprecedented military build up going on in Cuba. And the day after we wrote that report for the White House, NSA and DIA wrote reports saying that they'd studied everything carefully and it was a great agricultural build up. And at that very moment the U2 was on its way home, proving that we were right. That the stuff was coming in. That's a little known story.

GRAY: The U2 is no longer in use?

MARCHETE: It's still used occasionally. In certain situations.

GRAY: What's the difference in the U2 and any other airplane?

MARCHETE: Mainly, well with the U2 it has a great altitude and it's almost a glider. Once it gets up there, it just sort of glides along, and I think the U2's could go up around 60,000 feet which was outside of the range of missiles. That was its big advantage. But the A 11 which was later -also developed by CIA and then announced by President Johnson that time, down in Tennessee. That one can fly higher and about, Oh, I guess Mach 2 and a half, close to Mach 3, and is almost impossible to be shot down with a missile. Well, it was at the time it was developed.

GRAY: Now, the SAM?

MARCHETE: Well, yes, there are SAM's that can go high enough and far enough to get it today, but there isn't any need to use it because the satellites are so good.

GRAY: I see,

MARCHETE: You don't have to take this risk of turning a plane over.

GRAY: Did you read about, what was it, Gary Powers was a helicopter weather pilot in LA? A couple of weeks ago.

LEFCOURT: That's like your negligence lawyer.

GRAY: A helicopter weather pilot. We have just time for

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final words. Jerry? Jerry Goodman?

GOODMAN: Nothing much. Just from what Victor had to say, even looking at it objectively, I would guess that the CIA with all of the dangers inherent in where it is headed, is still a pretty good fact finding and interpretive agency.

BENN: Yes. But not as good as it should be.

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: If it stayed out of politics, that is.

GRAY: What does a CIA man earn? The same as his counterpart in GS work.

MARCHETE: Yes. In keeping with the rank.

GRAY: So, a man who has the rank of First Lieutenant is earning ...

(OVERTALK)

MARCHETE: Well, you want to know how much I made, is that it?

GRAY: No, no, no, no, no. But I can figure it out very easily if you were at the Brigadier level.

MARCHETE: All you have to do is look at the little card, and you can see.

GRAY: But you don't get to have any aides with you for the rest of your life.

MARCHETE: No. Absolutely not.

GOODMAN: I think he's got other kinds of aides with him now. He probably doesn't know about the people following him. Seeing what he's going to do next.

MARCHETE: I had a strange fellow calling me up since I've been in New York telling me he saw me on TV, and he once worked with the agency, and he'd like to get together with me. And it smelled kind of funny. So I said sure. And then he called up again and he wanted to know what else I was doing, and where I was going and who the people were. So I finally said, if you want to talk, meet me somewhere, and we'll talk. And he said O.K. Meet me at this restaurant. So I showed up there today, and he didn't. And I haven't heard from him since.

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: ...Changing your phone number right? You...

GRAY: Do you have a feeling that was a CIA guy?

MARCHETE: It's possible. I can't be sure. He may have just been a kook.

GRAY: But if, in fact that gentleman's agreement is at work, you're not saying anything that isn't, you know, if anybody wanted to find out they could get that kind of knowledge.

MARCHETE: Well some of it's - A lot of what I've been saying tonight, is not public knowledge. It would be made available to the proper authorities on demand of course. However, the proper authorities are very very small. For example, when Senator Fullbright wants to know certain things, he's not told. And the President tells someone that he should fight executive privilege and not tell it to him. And this is my beef. I think that the Congress should have a greater knowledge of what goes on in the intelligence community, and have more of a voice in its planning and its activities.

GOODMAN: I think that, to me is the biggest danger because if it isn't, you know - that whole intelligence community begins to move along, as bureaucracies do, the way the Soviet system has developed, and yet I don't think it has permeated to the point where it manipulates political life. I think right now it's just interested in it, and watching it. The Soviet Union, long ago, has manipulated political life, and my fear is that this could happen in this country. Very very easily.

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: ...Congress, and the signs are there.

(OVERTALK)

GOODMAN: ...On the grass roots level.

LEFCOURT: Jerry, I just got through a trial where the local New York Secret Police agents were the founding members of the New York Black Panther Party. And everybody who was tried in the Panther 21 case, came into the Black Panther Party after the agents, and if the New York Secret Police is into that kind of manipulation of that kind of political movement in this country, then I think that the CIA is much worse.

GRAY: Gentlemen, we are out of time. I thank you. Mr. Gerald Lefcourt, whose voice you just heard, attorney. He represents the Black Panthers. Mr. Noel Benn, author of "The Kremlin Letter" which is going to be a motion picture, and "The Shadow Boxer" which is in paperback. "The Kremlin Letter" by the way is published by Dell. "Shadow Boxer" published by Simon and Schuster, and

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Bantam paperback. Mr. Victor Marchete, author of "The Rope Dancer" a fine novel with an espionage theme, published by Grosset and Dunlap. Mr. Marchete was a high ranking CIA officer for 14 years. And Mr. Jerry Goodman, who is Executive Director of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, and he's researched the espionage networks of the Communist world, and the Middle East.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Sept. 20, 1971

Ex-CIA Man Tells Secret War Effort

By Jack Anderson

A former insider has charged that the Central Intelligence Agency has provided the President with the military wherewithal to wage his own private wars around the world and is geared to fight still new clandestine wars.

In a confidential memo to Rep. Herman Badillo (D-N.Y.) former CIA official Victor Marchetti makes these allegations:

- The White House has used "vague phraseology" in the law to build up a vast military arsenal and paramilitary force. Past presidents have ordered the CIA to wage secret wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America without the traditional constitutional safeguards and congressional oversight.

- The CIA "has bought and sold air transport companies all over the world" from the Congo to Nepal, so the President could mount paramilitary operations almost anywhere. Marchetti claims one such company, Air America, "has grown so large, owning more aircraft than most major U.S. airlines, that it was a source

of embarrassment within the agency. A senior officer had to be assigned the full-time job of keeping an eye on George Dole (the founder) in the hope of cooling his fantastic business success in the Far East."

- Southern Air Transport, a Miami-based firm, is also fingered by Marchetti as a CIA subsidiary. "The sole purpose for the existence of SAT," he asserts, "is that the CIA be ready for the contingency that some day it will have to ferry men and material to some Latin American country to wage a clandestine war."

Fire Fighters

Marchetti also identifies Rocky Mountain Air of Phoenix as "one of the more colorful companies owned by the CIA." This outfit, specializes, he says, "in training and air-lifting parachutists, ostensibly for fire fighting purposes." But he then points out that the CIA has no need of fire fighting capability "unless it is to put out military brushfires south of the border."

- The CIA's "air capabilities, its warehouses full of unmarked military supplies in the Midwest, a secret demolition training base in North

Carolina, even a secret airbase in Nevada, and its connections with international arms dealing firms," Marchetti charges, give the President a formidable, secret war-making capability.

A CIA spokesman acknowledged that Marchetti formerly held a position of trust at CIA headquarters. He resigned several months ago to write a novel, "The Rope Dancer," based on his CIA experiences. But he abandoned fiction recently to write a detailed background memo for Congressman Badillo, who has introduced legislation to restrict the CIA to intelligence gathering and to prohibit clandestine wars.

Declare Marchetti: "Airports and huge supply bases were secretly established up-country, close to the action. Arms and material were delivered by the boatload from the CIA's warehouses in the Far East and the United States.

"Guerrilla chieftains were recruited to lead the Meos, who would actually fight the war for the CIA. The government of Laos was placated and finessed into turning things over to the CIA opera-

tors who could conduct the conflict.

Swashbuckling Agents

"The chief of station—the CIA's top post in the field during the crucial moment—was His previous assignment had been Berlin, where he announced to the CIA contingent there upon his arrival that he intended 'to tear down that blankety-blank wall.' He was transferred to Laos before he had the opportunity to carry out his threat, in part because of his ferociousness.

"He has been succeeded by, former chief of station in the Belgian Congo. War things grew quiet there, and he once dropped everything for a clandestine foray into the French Congo in hopes of tracking down Che Guevara.

"He failed. But his operators a couple of years later eventually caught up with the revolutionary in Bolivia.

"These are the kind of men who have led the CIA in Laos and the CIA has led the way into another humiliating, unresolvable international dilemma."

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